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CONTINGENT FEE REGULATION BY COURT RULE
Gair v. Peck
6 N.Y.2d 97, 160 N.E.2d 43, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1959)
The defendants, Justices of the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court of New York, promulgated a rule which established in effect a scale
for contingent fees in ordinary personal injury and wrongful death actions.1
Plaintiff attorneys attacked the court's power to enforce the rule as being
unconstitutional and prohibited by statute. They contended that the rule
changed substantive law and was therefore a legislative matter. The New
York Court of Appeals, in reversing the lower courts, held that the purpose
of the rule was to discipline attorneys receiving larger fees than could be
collected according to existing law,2 and thus was within the Appellate
Division's statutory rule making power as a procedural device to regulate
conduct of attorneys.3
1 The rule, similar to bar association suggested fee schedules, provides that the
maximum contingent fee be limited to percentages of the gross award ranging from
507o of small recoveries to 25% on the amount over $25,000. In the alternative, the
agreement could stipulate for a fraction up to 1/3 of the total recovery. The rule
also provides that in extraordinary circumstances after a hearing, higher amounts may
be permitted in order to adequately compensate the attorney for his services. Attorneys
receiving more than the permitted amounts were deemed to be in violation of the
Canons of Professional Ethics and subject to disciplinary proceedings. The rule will
hereinafter be referred to as "the New York rule" even though it applies only in the
First Judicial Department. Gait v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 101-102 n.1, 160 N.E.2d 43,
45-46 n.1, 183 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1959), modified, 6 N.W.2d 983, 161 N.E.2d 736, 191 N.Y.S.
2d 951 (1959), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 374 (1960). Case discussed in 60 Colum. L.
Rev. 242 (1960); and 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1960).
2 "Contingent fees may be disallowed between an attorney and his client in spite
of contingent fee retainer agreements if the amount becomes large enough to be out of
all proportion to the value of the professional services rendered." Gait v. Peck, supra
note 1, at 106, 160 N.E.2d at 48.
3 "The rule-making power of the Appellate Divisions (N.Y. Judiciary Law, § 83)
in exercising their long standing 'power and control over attorneys and counsellors-at-
law' . . . (Judiciary Law, § 90, subd. 2) has always been adapted to the exigencies of
the times and to the ingenuity of lawyers who are trying to sail too close to the wind.
We think that it extended to the adoption of rule 4. In view of the existence of
subdivision 2 of section 90 of the Judiciary Law, it is not necessary to decide whether,
as part of the Supreme Court which is vested by the Constitution with the general
jurisdiction in law and equity (N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 1), the Appellate Divisions possess
similar powers over attorneys apart from statute." Gair v. Peck, supra note 1, at 115,
160 N.E.2d at 53.
N.Y. Judiciary Law, § 83 (1945). "... A majority of the justices of the appellate
division in each department, by order of such majority, shall have power, from time to
time, to adopt, amend or rescind any special rule for such department not inconsistent
with any statute or rule of civil practice."
N.Y. Judiciary Law, § 90 subd. 2 (1946). "The supreme court shall have power and
time, to adopt, amend or rescind any special rule for such department not inconsistent
control over attorneys and counsellors-at-law and all persons practicing or assuming to
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The use of contingent fees has been extensively commented upon.4
Most jurisdictions prohibit their use, the view being that they give the at-
torney a "stake in the claim"; in other words, their use is considered
champertous. In the United States, the only major country permitting the
use of contingent fees, the argument that they are socially necessary has
prevailed. Thus, those unable to pay a retainer are enabled to have their
claims litigated. The use of contingent fees where the client is able to pay
is being severely criticised and the explanation that their general use in
actions for damages is fair to clients generally and necessary for fair re-
muneration of attorneys, is not altogether convincing. However, "it seems
best to concede that the contingent fee is ethical where the client is unable
to pay and a genuine contingency as to the possibility of recovery exists."5
While the New York rule was held to be a procedural device to regulate
the bar, the strenuous dissents6 and lower court opinions7 indicate that the
rule may well amount to a substantive change in the law.8 The court's ulti-
mate determination of what circumstances are extraordinary to merit a de-
parture from the schedule and what constitutes adequate compensation
under those circumstances will determine whether substantive law has been
practice law, and the appellate division of the supreme court in each department is
authorized to censure, suspend from practice or remove from office any attorney who
is guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crime or misdemeanor,
or any conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; ...."
The extensive discussion of Cardozo's opinion in People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248
N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487, 60 A.L.R. 851 (1928) in the instant case indicates that the rule-
making power may be inherent in the New York courts. In Karlin, the court held
valid the punishment of an attorney for refusing to be sworn to testify before a court
conducting a general investigation into the conduct and practices of attorneys. Cardozo,
while summarizing the constitutional and legislative history concluded that ". . . there
is little room for doubt . . .that attorneys might be regulated by rules and orders of
the courts. The provision was declaratory of a jurisdiction that would have been im-
plied if not expressed." While Cardozo left the constitutional question unanswered, he
noted that ". . . the courts continued to act upon the theory that the power of regula-
tion was either implied or inherent." People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, supra, at 477, 162
N.E. at 492. The New York Constitution is silent on the court's power to make rules.
4 An excellent discussion appears in Comment, "Are Contingent Fees Ethical
Where Client is Able to Pay a Retainer," 20 Ohio St. L.J. 329 (1959).
5 Id. at 330. ". . . [hIf, however, it appears that the contract was induced by
fraud or misrepresentation, or that, in view of the nature of the claim, the compensation
is so excessive as to evidence a purpose on the part of the attorney to obtain an im-
proper or undue advantage over the client, the contract will not be enforced." 5 Am.
Jur. "Attorneys at Law" § 159 (1936).
6 Gair v. Peck, supra note 1 at 115, 123, 106 N.E.2d at 53, 58.
7 Gair v. Peck, 5 App. Div. 2d 303, 171 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1958); Gair v. Peck, 6
Misc. 2d 739, 165 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
8 The best statement of the substantive law is that the agreement must be reason-
able under all the circumstances. This statement appears in canon 13 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association as adopted by the New York
State Bar Association. The Supreme Court of Ohio has also adopted the canons of the
American Bar Association.
[Vol. 21
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
changed." The court might well have repeated the cautions expressed by
Cardozo in People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin10 to insure that the rule be con-
strued procedurally:
We place power and responsibility where in reason they should be.
No doubt the power can be abused but that is true of power gen-
erally. In discharging a function so responsible and delicate, the
courts will refrain, we may be sure, from a surveillance of the pro-
fession that would be merely odious or arbitrary. They will act
considerately and cautiously, mindful at all times of the dignity of
the bar and of the resentment certain to be engendered by any
tyrannous intervention.
In view of continuing concern directed toward excessive contingent
fees," this note will consider first-the law pertaining to contingent fees in
Ohio; second-whether solution by court rule is possible in Ohio; and third
-whether solution by court rule is desirable.
The Ohio Supreme Court decided at an early date that contingent fees
were enforceable. 12 While contracts for extortionate amounts made after the
attorney-client relationship has arisen will not be enforced,13 attorneys may
deal with prospective clients "at arm's length," making whatever bargain
they choose. 14 In short, contracts for contingent fees are enforceable in the
absence of undue influence, fraud or duress.15
However, such contracts are always subject to the inquiry as to
whether or not they are in contravention of public policy, or where
the attorney has by reason of surrounding circumstances obtained
an advantage, and to enforce such a contract would exact an un-
reasonable and unconscionable proportion of the claim.',
When a fee is held unconscionable, the attorney may recover the reasonable
value of his services by an action in quantum meruit.17
The Ohio Supreme Court has adopted the Canons of Professional (and
Judicial) Ethics of the American Bar Association.' 8 Canon 12 establishes
guides for determining an adequate but reasonable compensation for at-
torneys' services,19 and concludes that, "In fixing fees it should never be
9 Supra note 1.
10 Supra note 3, at 479, 480, 162 N.E. at 493.
11 A recent example entitled "When the Lawyer Gets the Spoils" by Murray Teigh
Bloom appeared in the March 1960 issue of the Reader's Digest at page 105. The author
discussed extreme instances of overreaching, expressing apparent lay approval of the
court rule involved in the instant case.
12 Spencer v. King, 5 Ohio 182 (1831).
13 Carlton v. Dustin, 10 Bull. 294 (Ohio 1883).
14 Boldt v. Baker, 13 Ohio App. 125 (1920); Carlton v. Dustin, supra note 13.
15 Reece v. Kyle, 49 Ohio St. 475, 31 N.E. 737, 16 L.R.A. 723 (1892); Healy v.
Robinson, 11 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 329, 21 Ohio Dec. 579 (Cincinnatti Munic. Ct. 1911).
16 American Vitrified Products Co. v. Crooks, 20 Ohio L. Abs. 627, 632 (Ct. App.
1935).
17 Id. at 633.
18 Ohio Supreme Court Rules of Practice, Rule 28.
19 The seven criteria mentioned involve time, work and skill of the attorney, the
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forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of justice and
not a mere money-getting trade." Canon 13 provides that, "A contract for
a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the com-
pensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court as to
its reasonableness." Even though the canons are not law, they are cogent
statements of the significant considerations. Thus, while contingent fees
should be disallowed if unreasonable or unconscionable,2" clarification is in
order to avoid possible misunderstandings arising from statements previously
set forth, appearing in the Ohio cases.
The Ohio courts have statutory power to make court rules,21 this power
being comparable to the New York statutes which empowered the New York
court to adopt its rule.22 However, the power of the Supreme Court of Ohio
to regulate the bar goes beyond the statutes.23 In affirming a disbarment
proceeding the court held that;
Although this court recognizes that the legislative branch may by
statute provide standards and qualifications for admission to the bar
and methods for the initiation and conduct of proceedings to disbar,
suspend or otherwise discipline attorneys for specified causes, such
legislation is to be interpreted as an aid to and not as a limitation
on the power of the judicial branch in these respects ...
There can be no question now of the inherent power of this
effect upon his practice, the amount in controversy, the contingency involved and the
customary charge for that service. The canon also indicates that a client's ability to
pay should only be considered to lower or even negate the attorney's fee.
20 "An unconscionable contract is said to be one 'such as no man in his senses and
not under a delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man
would accept on the other! . . .A contract will be regarded as unconscionable if the
inadequacy is so gross as to shock the conscience .... If an undue advantage is taken
to one's situation and circumstances by and through which an unfair and uncon-
scionable contract is obtained from him, equity upon proper application will afford
relief. . . ." Carter v. Boone County Trust Co., 338 Mo. 629, 651, 652, 92 S.,V.2d 647,
657 (1935), citing 1 Page, -Contracts, § 641 (1st ed. 1905).
21 Ohio Rev. Code § 2503.36 (1953). "The supreme court may prescribe rules for
the regulation of its practice, the reservation of questions, the transmission of cases to
it from the lower courts and the remanding of cases."
Ohio Rev. Code § 2505.49 (1953). "The supreme court may make and publish
rules with respect to the procedure in the supreme court not inconsistent with the laws
of the state.
"The several judges of the courts of common pleas and the judges of the courts
of appeals shall make rules not inconsistent with the laws of the state, for regulating
the practice and conducting the business of their respective courts, which they shall
submit to the supreme court. The supreme court may alter and amend such rules and
make other rules necessary for regulating the proceedings in any court."
22 Supra note 3.
23 The Ohio courts are creatures of the Ohio Constitution and as such have
"judicial power." Ohio Const. art. 4, § 1, "The judicial power of the state is vested
in a Supreme Court, Courts of Appeals, Courts of Common Pleas, Courts of Probate,
and such other courts inferior to the Courts of Appeals as may from time to time be
established by law."
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court as to the disciplining of attorneys and, therefore, of its power
to provide by rule the procedure in reference to hearings upon such
questions. That is all that was contemplated in the establishment
of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.
24
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court, in exercising its inherent rule-making powers
created a state-wide board to make findings, administer mild disciplinary
action and submit recommendations to the supreme court.25 The board is
empowered to investigate complaints of misconduct by, or practices of, any
attorney or counselor-at-law or judge which tend to defeat the administration
of justice or bring the courts or legal profession into disrepute. "Misconduct
. . . shall mean any violation of any provision of the oath of office . . . or
any violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics . . . or the commission
of a crime involving moral turpitude.
'26
Therefore, it being established that the Ohio courts have inherent power
to provide by rule for disciplinary proceedings, a procedural rule merely
enforcing the law ought to be held valid in Ohio as well as in New York.
In Ohio, a fee schedule seemingly could be adopted by an amendment to the
definition of "misconduct" with enforcement proceedings being had under
the facilities previously discussed.
Aside from the New York type of court rule, there have been varied
attempts at preventing the exaction of excessive contingent fees. As previ-
ously noted, many jurisdictions have abolished the use of contingent fees.
Maine has canons disapproving contingent fees and they are permitted
in Massachusetts only when the client is unable to pay a retainer.27 Okla-
homa, by statute, limits contingent fees to 50% of the net recovery.28
Most states operate on an ad hoc basis with individual determinations by the
courts as necessary. The latter procedure presented a burden which the
New York court felt obliged to relieve by the rule in the instant case.
29 If
the use of contingent fees should arouse public indignation, or if individual
determinations become burdensome for the courts it will be necessary to take
some action. In that event, the apparent flexibility and judicial control of
the New York rule makes it worthy of serious consideration. Indeed, as
Cardozo observed in Karlin,"° "If the house is to be cleaned, it is for those
who occupy and govern it, rather than for strangers, to do the noisome
work."
William B. Badger
24 -Cleveland Bar Assoc. v. Pleasant, 167 Ohio St. 325, 334, 335, 148 N.E.2d 493,
494 (1958), citing In re McBride, 164 Ohio St. 419, 132 N.E.2d 113 (1956).
25 The operation of the board was discussed in "Disbarment and Reinstatement
Procedure in Ohio," 18 Ohio St. L.J. 139 (1957).
26 Ohio Supreme Court Rules of Practice, Rule 27(1).
27 Comment, supra note 4, at 337.
28 Oklahoma Stats. Ann. tit. 5, § 7 (1953).
20 ... Contingent fee agreements have been filed with the Clerk of the First
Department [pursuant to another court rule] at an annual rate of 150,000 or more, of
which upwards of 607 have fixed the attorneys' compensation at 50%o of the amount
of recovery." Gair v. Peck, supra note 1 at 102, 160 N.E.2d at 45.
80 People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, suprm note 3 at 480, 162 N.E. 493.
1960]

